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Framework Programme 10 must recognise that autonomy depends on international cooperation, says Jakob Edler
When Carlos Moedas became European commissioner for research and innovation in 2014, he made the ‘three opens’—open innovation, open science and open to the world—his defining aims. Since then, there has been Brexit, the Covid-19 pandemic, the rise of protectionist policies across the Trump and Biden administrations in the US, the breakdown of trust with China, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and intensified conflict in the Middle East.
Nations worldwide are retreating from open borders, free trade and global supply chains. In science and technology policy, these trends have made technology sovereignty an increasingly important priority.
At the same time, the EU is losing ground in technologies including computing and semiconductors, where it relies on foreign input of knowledge, technological components or raw materials. This also compromises other goals dependent on these technologies, such as the transition to green energy.
The concept of technology sovereignty goes beyond the question of economic competitiveness that has dominated European R&I policy in recent decades. It means an ability to act without being unilaterally dependent on others.
This requires the secure provision of technologies, now and in the future, for delivering the core duties of the state, such as security and health provision, and for meeting societal challenges such as climate change. It also means that any given technology can be used in line with the continent’s basic values.
What it doesn’t mean is that Europe should be self-sufficient. As long as one-sided dependencies are avoided, sovereignty can be secured by ensuring access to a technology as much as by building the ability to produce it.
Navigating tensions
The rationale for Moedas’s approach still holds. Science is both global and specialised in its division of labour and spread of expertise. That makes securing scientific collaboration a crucial aspect of autonomy. Restrictions will make the science system less productive, to everyone’s detriment.
Navigating the tension between technology sovereignty and openness will shape Framework Programme 10, the EU’s next R&I programme, which will succeed Horizon Europe in 2028. And FP10 will in turn have a major part to play in whether Europe’s bid for technology sovereignty succeeds.
There are existing strengths to build on. Member states already have complementary technological strengths that should be easy to pool within the internal market. The market’s size also gives the EU the power to shape global trade, regulations and, in parts, production.
Shifting the focus from competitiveness to sovereignty also widens the debate, from specific industries or scientific organisations lobbying for more sectoral support, to safeguarding science and technology for the sake of many other policy areas, including health, climate and defence. This, in fact, was the original motivation for adding science policy to the European remit in the 1980s.
As a result, R&I policy will now need to be increasingly strategic. This includes the need to form international partnerships. It must also include a holistic approach coordinated with trade, industrial and foreign policy.
Vicious and virtuous circles
Much, however, remains contested or undecided across Europe. There is no consensus across the EU’s institutions or national governments on what technology sovereignty means or in what sectors it is most urgently required, let alone how that should be achieved.
Further, more interventionist and selective science and innovation policies will create winners and losers across sectors and places, making decisions politically charged. Aligning national and European approaches will be critical.
This will require an explicit and transparent strategy and—a challenge at the EU level—a high degree of political legitimacy. If sovereignty policies are proclaimed but fail to deliver, the EU’s legitimacy may be severely damaged.
The risk is that Europe gets trapped in a vicious circle. If different global power blocs all chase autonomy in the same technologies, variety in science and innovation may diminish while competition in these areas intensifies, reinforcing the push for isolation and protectionism.
Instead, while recognising the legitimate fears of becoming dependent on or vulnerable towards a small number of global economic and political actors, the EU should aim to create a virtuous circle, using openness to build autonomy. Through mindful openness, international cooperation and engagement, Europe can benefit not only in trade, division of labour and international complementarities but also by influencing international rules, regulations and standards, increasing its negotiation power.
The stronger the EU is technologically and economically, the more powerful it is in international negotiations and trade relations. The more open it is to those international collaborations and relations, the more economically powerful and autonomous it can become.
Jakob Edler is executive director of the Fraunhofer Institute for Systems and Innovation Research in Karlsruhe, Germany, and a professor at the Manchester Institute of Innovation Research in the UK.