Medical academy warned in 2003 of lack of mechanisms for providing research funding in emergencies
This week, the UK prime minister told MPs that “the brutal reality is this country did not learn the lessons of Sars or Mers” epidemics and so was not ready to quickly respond to Covid-19.
The Academy of Medical Sciences warned back in 2003 that the UK should review expertise and ensure coordination of activities to respond to future emerging diseases.
The country, it said, got lucky with Sars (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) because it had pre-existing expertise but added that this may not be the case in future epidemics.
It singled out the lack of R&D funding during such health emergencies, saying that “ad hoc arrangements do not offer much confidence that the UK will respond effectively to future emergencies”.
Here we republish the article about that warning in full.
UK got lucky with SARS expertise, warns medical academy
The UK research community responded well to the crisis around severe acute respiratory syndrome, but it may not be so lucky with the next disease outbreak.
A meeting on SARS, hosted by the Academy of Medical Sciences on 9 June 2003, concluded that the UK was lucky because it already had coronavirus expertise available.
“Equivalent expertise may not be available ‘next time’, for a different virus, for example a flavivirus (eg West Nile and related viruses),” a summary of the meeting says.
The academy says that there is a need to review expertise in the UK and to ensure coordination of activities so that resources are not wasted on excessive duplication and a fast response can be mounted against new threats.
“There appears to be no mechanisms for providing funding in an emergency,” it says. “Coronavirus expertise in Bristol was mobilised efficiently to support the Health Protection Agency, but only through the use of university funds. Such ad hoc arrangements do not offer much confidence that the UK will respond effectively to future emergencies.”
Funding is required to build academic research capacity in pathogen discovery and host specificity, prioritising according to perceived risk but also ensuring cover and response capability.
“The UK is losing competitiveness in this field and the weakness is exacerbated by unnecessary divisions between human and animal health research (divorced at both funding and policy levels),” it adds.
“Insufficient notice has been taken of the interface between human and animal infectious diseases in allocating priorities for funding; there is a need for more connectivity between the funding bodies in order to encourage and support joint programmes in veterinary and human medicine.”